Price-Fixing under Patent License Agreements by Kelleher, Grant W.
Montana Law Review 
Volume 3 
Issue 1 Spring 1942 Article 13 
1942 
Price-Fixing under Patent License Agreements 
Grant W. Kelleher 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Grant W. Kelleher, Price-Fixing under Patent License Agreements, 3 Mont. L. Rev. (1942). 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/13 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. 
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
Montana Law Review
SPRING, 1942
Price-Fixing Under Patent License
Agreements
Grant W. Kelleher*
The Sherman Antitrust Act' is a declaration by Congress
that "competition, not combination, should be the law of
trade.'" It is intended to preserve "an unrestricted competi-
tive system"' by prohibiting "any combination whatever to
secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of com-
merce." It has been likened to a "charter of freedom" with
"a generality and adaptability comparable to that found to
be desirable in constitutional provisions" and with an absence
of particularization "which might defeat its purposes by pro-
viding loopholes for escape."' The thrust of the Act is not
measured by "rights" which existed at the time of its passage;
"the Act is its own measure of right and wrong, of what it
permits or forbids.'" Among the interdictions of the Act none
appears more sweeping or uncompromising than the prohibi-
*Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States; LL.B.
Montana State University, 1934.
'Act of July 2, 1890, c. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 STAT. 209, 15 U. S. C. § 1, 2. Sec-
tion 1 of the Act provides, in part, as follows:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, In restraint of trade or commerce among the several
States, or with foreign nations, Is hereby declared to be illegal...
Section 2 of the Act provides, in part, as follows:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monoplize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monop-
olize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States,
or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor...
"Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission (1941) 812
U. S. 457, 465, 85 L. Ed. 949, 61 S. Ct. 703.
'United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 392, 397, 71
L. Ed. 700, 47 S. Ct. 377.
'Loewe v. Lawlor (1908) 208 U. S. 274, 293-294, 52 L. Ed. 488, 28 S. Ct.
301.
5Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States (1933) 288 U. S. 344, 360-361,
77 L. Ed. 825, 53 S. Ct. 471.
*Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 49,
57 L. Ed. 107, 33 S. Ct. 9.
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tion against concerted price-fixing by those engaged in the in-
terstate sale of commodities.' Any combination formed for
the purpose and with the effect "of raising, depressing, peg-
ging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or
foreign commerce is illegal per se" and in this respect the law
"establishes one uniform rule applicable to all industries alike.'"
Despite the broad sweep thus attributed to the Act, there is
a large area in which it has only a limited application. The
Constitution has conferred upon Congress the power "to pro-
mote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for lim-
ited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries,'" and, pursuant to this del-
egation of power, Congress has enacted legislation to protect by
patent "the exclusive right" of an inventor "to make, use, or
vend the invention or discovery" in the United States for a term
of seventeen years." The effect of this legislation is to create in
the patentee a 17-year lawful monopoly in the patented article.
It is plain that the Sherman Act was not intended to in-
trude upon the monopoly conferred upon the inventor by the
patent laws. The Act is designed to protect the public against
the arrogation of monopolistic power by private persons without
Government sanction. The patent monopoly is a grant by the
Federal Government which is intended to further the public in-
terest by promoting "the progress of science and useful arts." "1
There is, therefore, no inherent clash between the Sherman Act
and the patent laws so far as the latter give to the inventor the
exclusive right to make, use, and vend.
Modern industrial and commercial conditions, however, fre-
quently make it desirable today for the patentee to license others
to make, use, and vend. It is here that conflict with the policy
of the antitrust laws arises. Patent licenses frequently contain
agreements between the patentee and the licensee by which
7United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association (1897) 166 U. S.
290, 41 L. Ed. 1007, 17 S. Ct. 540; United States v. Joint Traffic Asso-
ciation (1898) 171 U. S. 505, 43 L. Ed. 259, 19 S. Ct. 25; Addyston Pipe
& Steel Co. v. United States (1899) 175 U. S. 211, 44 L. Ed. 136, 20
S. Ct. 96; American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States (1921)
257 U. S. 377, 66 L. Ed. 284, 42 S. Ct. 114; United States v. American
Linseed Oil Co. (1923) 262 U. S. 371, 67 L. Ed. 1035, 43 S. Ct. 607;
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co. (1927) 273 U. S. 392, 71 L. Ed.
700, 47 S. Ct. 377; Sugar Institute, Inc. v. United States (1936) 297
U. S. 553, 80 L. Ed. 859, 56 S. Ct. 629.
8United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. (1940) 310 U. S. 150, 222-
223, 84 L. Ed. 1129, 60 S. Ct. 811.
'U. S. CONST. Art I, §8.
1°Act of July 8, 1870, 16 STAT. 203, 35 U. S. C. §40.
"Morton Salt Co. v. The G. S. Suppiger Co. (decided Jan. 5, 1942)
........ U S .........
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the competition of the license is substantially restricted. These
agreements are of various kinds, but the usual and most im-
portant from the point of view of the antitrust laws is an
agreement by the licensee to sell at prices designated by the
patentee. Despite the repeated condemnation by the Supreme
Court of concerted price-fixing among competitors, the Court
first held in 1903," and reaffirmed this holding in 1926," that
such an agreement in a patent license does not violate the
Sherman Act.
The swath cut by this exception to the general rule that
price-fixing is unlawful under the Sherman Act is wide. Every
major industry owes its existence to patented inventions.1' A
great portion of the common articles of commerce and trade
and a large part of the machinery and equipment used in pro-
ducing goods are patented.' The United States Patent Office
has issued over 2,000,000 patents, 740,000 of which are extant,1'
and the Office is issuing an increasing number of patents each
year.1' Moreover, there is a growing concentration of patents
in the hands of corporations, to which the public must look for
the bulk of the commodities which it buys."
The danger to the competitive system from patent license
restrictions upon competition has recently become apparent
from investigations by the legislative and executive branches
of the Government. In a message to Congress on April 20,
1938, the President proposed an investigation looking toward
possible "amendment of the patent laws to prevent their use
to suppress inventions, and to create industrial monopolies."
The result of his message was a joint resolution of Congress
"Bement v. National Harrow Company (1902) 186 U. S. 70, 46 L. Ed.
1058, 22 S. Ct. 747.
"United States v. General Electric Company (1926) 272 U. S. 476, 71
L. Ed. 362, 47 S. Ct 192.
"HFARINGs BEFORE TNEC, Part III, p. 839.
"See the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black In General Talking
Pictures Corp. v. Western Electric Co. (1938) 304 U. S. 175, 186, 82
L. Ed. 1273, 58 S. Ct. 849.
"HEARINGs BEFORE TNEC, Part III, p. 843; Borkin, Patents and the
New Trust Problem, 7 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (Duke Uni-
versity) 74, 76 (1940).
"'In the 50-year period between 1880 and 1930, the number of patent ap-
plications filed with the Patent Office increased 260% and patents
issued increased 233%. HEARINos BEmsORE TNEC, Ex. 179, Part III,
p. 1123. During the 10-year period between 1921 and 1931, there was
a 31% increase in the number of patents Issued. Id., Ex. 180, p. 1123.
"Between 1921 and 1938, 57% of all patents issued went to corporations
and the number going to corporations with assets of over $50,000,000
increased from less than 5.% in 1921 to slightly over 17% in 1936.
Id., Exs. 187 (p. 1127) 183 (p. 1125).
"Sen. Doc. No. 173, 75th Cong. 3d Sess. (1938).
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creating a committee, known as the "Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee," to investigate, among other things, the ef-
fect of existing patent policies upon competition and price lev-
els." Simultaneously with the investigation which the TNEC
conducted, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Jus-
tice, prompted by complaints "showing a widespread tendency
to misuse the patent privilege to evade the Federal antitrust
laws," conducted a general investigation through grand juries
"of the use of patents, patent pooling agreements and patent
licensing agreements by which certain industries in the United
States are controlled and dominated by one or several large
companies .... "
In 1941 the TNEC reported that the patent monopoly "has
been shamefully abused" and has been used "to control whole
industries, to suppress competition, to restrict output, to en-
hance prices, to suppress inventions, and to discourage invent-
iveness." The Committee, composed of members of both ma-
jor political parties, unanimously recommended that "the hold-
er of a patent should not be permitted to restrict a licensee in
respect of the amount of any article he may produce, the price
at which he may sell, the purpose for which or the manner in
which he may use the patent or any article produced thereun-
der, or the geographical area within which he may produce or
sell such article. "
During the two years which have elapsed since the Depart-
ment commenced its investigation, 26 cases, civil or criminal,
have been instituted, charging violations of the antitrust laws
by the use of patent license agreements.' The products which
'Pub. Res. No. 113, 75th Cong. 3d Sess: (1938), §2(a) (3).
"DEPARTMEN T OF JUSTICE PUBLIC STATEMENT, Dec. 11, 1939.
0FxNAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TEMPORARY NATIONAL
ECONOMIC COMMITTEE, Sen. Doc. No. 35 77th Cong. 1st Sess. (presented
March 31, 1941).
"United States v. Aluminum Co. of America (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No.
109-189, Jan. 30, 1941) ; United States v. American Colloid Co. (S. D.
N. Y. Criminal No. 108-165, Aug. 29, 1940); United States v. American
Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 107-418, May 28, 1940); United
States v. American Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 107-417, May
28, 1940) ; United States v. American Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y. Civil
No. 10-392, Sept. 16, 1940) ; United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical
Co. (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 107-169, Mar. 26, 1940) 34 F. Supp. 267;
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y. Civil No.
9-404, filed July 8, 1940, and consent decree entered July 9, 1940);
United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. (S. D. N. Y. Civil No. 10-
394, Sept. 16, 1940) ; United States v. Certain-teed Products Corpora-
tion (D. C. D. C. Criminal No. 66007, June 28, 1940) 37 F. Supp. 406;
United States v. Corning Glass Works (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 108-
164, Aug. 28, 1940) ; United States v. Dow Chemical Co. (S. D. N. Y.
Criminal No. 109-191, Jan. 30, 1941) ; United States v. General Aniline
4
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are the subject of these agreements are numerous and varied;
they include, among many others, wallboard," gasoline pumps,"
eyeglasses," machine tools," electric light bulbs," and glass con-
tainers.*
The Department's investigation has revealed that it is a
common practice for companies owning patents to control the
price policies of entire industries by licensing most of their
competitors to manufacture under the patents and reserving
the right to fix the selling price of the patented articles.'
Where patents are so used, it is generally claimed that this is
lawful under the decision in United States v. General Electric
Co.' The unanimity and vigor with which the TNEC condemned
the use of patents to fix prices and the widespread use of pat-
& Film Corp. (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 111-136, Dec. 19, 1941) ; United
States v. General Dyestuff Corp. (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 111-135,
Dec. 19, 1941; United States v. General Electric Co. (D. N. J. Civil
No. 1364, Jan. 27, 1941) ; United States v. General Electric Co., et al.
(S. D. N. Y., Criminal No. 110-412, Oct. 21, 1941); United States v.
Hartford-Empire Co. (N. D. Ohio W. D. Civil No. 4426, Dec. 11, 1939) ;
United States v. Johns-Manville (N. D. Ill. E. D. Civil No. 1817, June
24, 1940); United States v. Optical Wholesalers National Ass'n. Inc.
(S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 107-419, May 28, 1940); United States v.
Schering Corp. (D. N. J. Criminal No. 550, Dec. 17, 1941); United
States v. Dietrich A. Schmitz (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No. 111-137, Dec.
19, 1941); United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (D. C. D. C.
Criminal No. 66008, June 28, 1940) 37 F. Supp. 398 (verdict for all de-
fendants directed by District Court, Nov. 19, 1941) ; United States v.
United States Gypsum Co. (D. C. D. C. Civil No. 8017, Aug. 15, 1940) ;
United States v. The Univis Lens Co., Inc. (S. D. N. Y. Civil No. 10-
392, Sept. 16, 1940) 41 F. Supp. 258, now on appeal to the Supreme
Court; United States v. The Wayne Pump Co. (N. D. Ill. E. D. Crim-
inal Nos. 32597 and 32598, Jan. 31, 1941) (demurrer to indictments
sustained February 16, 1942) ; United States v. Whitehead Brothers
Co. (S. D. N. Y. Civil No. 17-GG, Jan. 7, 1942) (consent decree en-
tered January 7, 1942).
"United States v. United States Gypsum Co., supra.
"United States v. The Wayne Pump Co., supra.
rUnited States v. American Optical Co, supra; United States v. Op-
tical Wholesalers National Ass'n. Inc., &upra; United States v. The
Univis Lens Co., Inc., supra.
nUnited States v. General Electric Co., et al, (S. D. N. Y. Criminal No.
110-412), supra
"United States v. General Electric Co. (D. N. J. Civil No. 1364), upra.
"United States v. Hartford-Empire Co., supra.
"In United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (D. C. D. C. Civil No.
8017), supra, for example, it is admitted that since 1929 the price at
which all gypsum wallboard has been sold in the United States east of
the Rocky Mountains has been fixed by the United States Gypsum
Company under patent license agreements executed between that com-
pany and all other companies manufacturing wallboard in the eastern
area of the United States. See ANswxa or UNirD STATES GypSUM
COMPANY filed in the District Court of the United States for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, August 1, 1941.
81(1926) 272 U. S. 476, 71 L. Ed. 362, 47 S. Ct. 192.
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ents for this purpose which the Department's investigation has
revealed indicate that there is strong reason for reconsideration
by the Court of its holding in that case. This may occur in the
near future and it is, therefore, timely to consider the back-
ground of the case, its rationale, and the later decisions which
bear upon the holding of the case. Such is the purpose of this
discussion. I.
While the right to assign a patent is provided by statute,"
the license is a creature of the common law.' An assignment of
a patent passes to the assignee a property interest in the patent
which gives him the right to sue for infringement, either separ-
ately or jointly with the patentee depending upon the nature of
the assignment." A license does not effect a transfer of title,
but simply gives to the licensee a non-exclusive franchise to
make, use, or vend the patented product; in substance, it
amounts to little more than a covenant by the patentee not to
sue the licensee for infringement.'
Long before the Sherman Act became law, the Supreme
Court recognized that a patentee might restrict his licensee as
to the purposes for which the patent might be used and the pe-
riod of its use,' and that he might, by contract, bind the pur-
chaser of a patented article to observe such limitations.' On the
' Act of July 8, 1870, c. 230, §36, 16 STAT. 203, as amended, 35 U. S. C.
§47.11L. L. Brown Paper Co. v. Hydrolold (S. D. N. Y. 1939) 32 F. Supp.
857; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. (C. C. S. D. Ohio
1886) 29 F. 17, 43.
"Gayler v. Wilder (1850) 10 How. 477, 494, 51 U. S. 477, 13 L. Ed. 504;
Waterman v. MacKenzie (1891) 138 U. S. 252, 255-256, 34 L. Ed. 923,
11 S. Ct. 334; Moore v. Marsh (1868) 7 Wall. 515, 520, 74 U. S. 515, 19
L. Ed. 37; Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works (1923)
261 U. S. 24, 37-38, 67 L. Ed. 516, 43 S. Ct. 254.
United States v. General Electric Co., 8upra, p. 489; DeForest Co. v.
United States (1927) 273 U. S. 236, 242, 71 L. Ed. 625, 47 S. Ct. 366.
'In Rubber Co. v. Goodyear (1869) 9 Wall. 788, 76 U. S. 788, 19 L. Ed.
566, the licensee was licensed to use a patented composition for vul-
canizing rubber at his own establishment, the license "not being in-
tended to convey any right to make any contract with the government
of the United States." The Court held that the use of the patented
composition to manufacture under contracts with the United States
constituted infringement. In Mitchell v. Hawley (1872) 16 Wall. 544,
83 U. S. 544, 21 L. Ed. 322, the license provided that the licensee might
manufacture and use patented machines and vend the machines to oth-
ers, but only during the life of the original patent grant and not dur-
ing any extension thereof. The Court held that the use of the ma-
chine, after the expiration of the original grant, by a purchaser from
a licensee constituted infringement.
"Mitchell v. Hawley, supra. See General Talking Pictures Corp. v.
Western Electric Co. (1938) 304 U. S. 175, 82 L. Ed. 1273, 58 S. Ct.
849, on rehearing 305 U. S. 124, 83 L. Ed. 81, 59 S. Ct. 116, in which
the doctrine of Mitchell v. Hawley was reaffirmed.
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other hand, it became established that the purchase and exercise
of the unrestricted right to use a patented article terminated the
monopoly of the patentee with respect to that article.' Thus,
when a patentee permitted another to construct and operate pat-
ented machines, upon their construction and operation the licen-
see "acquired full dominion over the property of the machines,
and an absolute and unrestricted right to use and operate them
until they were worn out.'' This was followed by the decision
in Adams v. Burke' that the purchaser of a patented product-
in that instance, coffin lids-from an assignee having an exclu-
sive right to manufacture, use, and sell the lids only in the city
of Boston was free to use them throughout the United States.
In Bloomer v. McQuewan," the Court for the first time as-
serted that a patent gives to the owner the right merely to ex-
clude others from making, using, and vending the patented ar-
ticle. Accordingly, it was soon held that a patent in no way ex-
panded the common law right of the patentee to make, use, and
vend, and that, therefore, the fact that an article was patented
did not prevent a state from exercising its police power to regu-
late the sale by the patentee of the patented article."
In the first case involving the validity of a restricted license
to reach the Supreme Court after the passage of the Sherman
8'Wilson v. Rousseau (1846) 4 How. 646, 45 U. S. 646, 11 L. Ed. 1141;
Bloomer v. McQuewan (1852) 14 How. 539, 55 U. S. 539, 14 L. Ed.
532; Bloomer v. Millinger (1863) 1 Wall. 340, 68 U. S. 340, 17 L. Ed.
581. See also Chaffee v. Boston Belting Co. (1859) 22 How. 217, 63 U.
S. 217, 16 L. Ed. 240. Each of these cases involved the effect of a
renewal of a patent upon a grantee of the unrestricted right to use
the patented article.
BBloomer v. Millinger, supra, p. 350.
'0(1873) 17 Wall. 453, 84 U. S. 453, 21 L. Ed. 700.
'In Hobbie v. Jennison (1893) 149 U. S. 355, 37 L. Ed. 766, 13 S. Ct. 879,
the Court held that the same rule applied where the purchaser bought
with knowledge of the restriction upon the assignee. In Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed Co. (J.895) 157 U. S. 659, 39 L. Ed. 848, 15 S.
Ct. 738, the Court held that the purchaser might also sell the patented
article any place in the United States without becoming liable for in-
fringement.
"S upra, p. 548.
"OPatterson v. Kentucky (1878) 97 U. S. 501, 24 L. Ed. 1115. For later
cases similarly recognizing the limited scope of the patent grant, see
United States v. American Bell Telephone Co. (1897) 167 U. S. 224,
239, 42 L. Ed. 144, 17 S. Ct. 809; Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell (1913) 229
U. S. 1, 10, 57 L. Ed. 1041, 33 S. Ct. 616; Motion Picture Patents Co. v.
Universal Film Mfg. Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 502, 510, 61 L. Ed. 871, 37
S. Ct. 416. The corollary that a restriction in a patent license agree-
ment upon sale by a licensee was subject to state control soon followed
in the lower federal courts. Missouri ex rel. Baltimore & Ohio Co. v.
Bell Telephone Co. (C. C. E. D. Mo. 1885) 23 F. 539, appeal dismissed
(1888) 127 U. S. 780, 32 L. Ed. 328. See also State ex rel. Postal Tel-
egraph Cable Co. v. Delaware & A. Tel. & Tel. Co. (C. C. Del. 1891)
47 F. 633, affirmed (C. C. A. 3d, 1892) 50 F. 677.
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Act, the Court concluded that the restrictions were void because
contrary to public policy and in restraint of trade." This deci-
sion gave some indication that the Court might consider the
Sherman Act as a severe limitation upon the contractual rights
of a patentee, and might narrowly construe the right of a paten-
tee to control his licensee. If such was the intention of the
Court, it was shortlived.
In 1896, the court of appeals for the sixth circuit decided
the now celebrated Button-Fa.tener case," which was to affect
profoundly the decisions of the Supreme Court. The opinion in
the case was written by Circuit Judge Lurton, who sixteen years
later, as a justice of the Supreme Court, was to write the opinion
in Henry v. A. B. Dick,' adopting the rule of the Button-Fasten-
er case. His opinion was concurred in by Circuit Judge Taft
who, as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, handed down the
opinion in the General Electric case in 1926. The effect of the
decision was to expand the rights of a patentee beyond anything
theretofore indicated and to make the Sherman Act virtually in-
applicable to patent license agreements.
Heaton-Peninsular was the owner of patents upon a ma-
chine for affixing buttons to shoes with the use of metallic fast-
eners. The company chose to exploit its patents, not by the sale
of patented machines, but by the sale of unpatented fasteners
which it manufactured. To this end, it attached a license no-
tice to all machines which it sold that the machines were to be
used only with fasteners sold by Heaton-Peninsular. Eureka
Specialty sold fasteners to vendees of the machines with knowl-
edge that the fasteners were to be used in the machines and
Heaton-Peninsular sued for contributory infringement.
The defendant contended (1) that, under Adams v. Burke,"
the sale exhausted the patent mopopoly and that, therefore, a
suit for infringement did not lie, and (2) that the arrangement
was in restraint of trade because it was an attempt to monopo-
"Pope Mfg. Co. v. Gormully (1892) 144 U. S. 224, 36 L. Ed. 414, 12 S. Ct.
632. The Court declined to order specific performance of a patent li-
cense agreement in which the licensee covenanted never to make or sell
certain articles covered by patents owned by the licensor and never
to contest the validity of the patents or plaintiff's title thereto. The
agreement also required the licensee to sell at prices to be fixed by the
lisensor. While the validity of this provision was not involved, the
Court cited It (p. 232) as an example of "other covenants In this con-
tract which show that the plaintiff intended to reserve to Itself a large
supervision and control of the defendant's business."
"Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co. (C. C.
A. 6th, 1896,) 77 F. 288.
"(1912) 224 U. S. 1, 56 L. Ed. 645, 32 S. Ct. 364.
'Supra,.
8
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lize an unpatented product-button fasteners. On the first
point, the court decided that, since the sale of machines in this
instance was conditional, Adams v. Burke was inapplicable be-
cause that case involved an unconditional sale. The patent gave
to the patentee the exclusive right to use, and he was, therefore,
free to attach any condition he chose upon others desiring to
use the patented machine so long as the condition did not offend
positive law. The imposition of such a condition had the effect
of continuing the machine "within the prohibition of the monop-
oly" and any use in violation of the condition constituted in-
fringement.
Nor did the court believe that the monopoly of unpatented
fasteners achieved through the use of the patent upon the ma-
chine violated the Sherman Act. The monopoly in the unpat-
ented staple, the court concluded, was but an incident of the law-
ful monopoly upon the machine which the law had given the
patentee."
The impact of this decision upon the Supreme Court was
first felt six years later when the Court in Bement v. National
Harrow Co." was called upon for the first time to pass upon the
lawfulness under the Sherman Act of a patent license agree-
ment in which the licensor reserved the right to fix its licen-
see's selling price. National Harrow Company was the as-
signee of patents owned by seven of the leading manufacturers
of harrows, including Bement, the defendant. Bement was li-
censed by National Harrow to manufacture and sell harrows
under certain of the patents and agreed to sell at prices speci-
fied in the license contract. National Harrow sued in a New
York state court for violation of the contract. National Har-
row and its predecessor had entered into similar contracts with
the other manufacturers who had assigned their patents to
National Harrow, and one state court and three federal courts
had held that the contractual arrangements were but a device
to fix prices on an industry-wide basis and were, therefore,
"8The court declared that the patentee had an absolute right to use the
machine exclusively, or even to suppress it. If Heaton-Peninsular had
elected not to license others to use its machine and had decided to en-
gage in the manufacture of shoes, it could have lawfully used only
its own fasteners in its machine, the effect of which would have been
to give the company a monopoly upon fasteners used in the patented
machine. Who then, asked the court, can complain that the same re-
suit is accomplished by an arrangement under which the right to the
exclusive use of the patented machine is surrendered and the patentee
contents himself with a monopoly of the market for the unpatented
article used in the machine?
"Suvra.
9
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void because in restraint of trade.' The Supreme Court side-
stepped this question by concluding that the report of the ref-
eree before whom the evidence was heard failed to show that
National Harrow had entered into agreements with manufac-
turers other than Bement,' and viewed the case as presenting
only the narrow question whether a price-fixing agreement in
a single patent license agreement was lawful under the Sher-
man Act. The Court, relying upon the Button-Fastener case,
held that the requirement that the licensee sell at prices fixed
by the patentee was "an appropriate and reasonable condition"
because the patent holder had an absolute right to the exclusive
use of his invention and "the general rule is absolute freedom
in the use or sale of rights under the patent laws of the United
States.' "
Bement v. National Harrow was the first case in which the
Supreme Court indicated approval of the doctrine of the Button-
Fastener case. It was followed by the Paper Bag case" in which
the Court, in accordance with dictum of the Button-Fastener
case, held that a patentee might sue for infringement, despite
the fact that he had intentionally suppressed his patent, and by
Henry v. Dick,' in which, in a 4 to 3 decision, it was held that
a patentee might sell a patented machine and restrict its use to
unpatented material."
The decisions in the Paper Bag and Dick cases represented
the high-water mark of the Button-Fastener doctrine. Encroach-
"Strait v. National Harrow Co. (Sup. Ct. N. Y. 1891) 18 N. Y. S. 224;
National Harrow Co. v. Hench (C. C. Pa. 1896) 76 F. 667, aff'd (C.
C. A. 3d, 1897) 83 F. 36; National Harrow Co. v. Quick (C. C. Ind.
1895) 67 F. 130. See also National Harrow Co. v. Hench (N. D. N. Y.
1898) 84 F. 226.
"Bement v. National Harrow Co., smpra, pp. 83-87.
"Id., p. 93.
"Id., pp. 89, 91.
"Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co. (1908) 210 U. S.
405, 52 L. Ed. 1122, 28 S. Ct. 748.
"Supra.
"The facts in the Dick case were almost identical with those in the
Heaton-Peninsular case. A. B. Dick sold its patented mimeographing
machine with a "license restriction" attached to the machine provid-
ing that the mechine was to be used only with paper, ink, and other
supplies made by Dick. Henry sold ink to a vendee of the machine
with knowledge that it was to be used in the patented machine and
Dick sued for contributory infringement. The Court had twice before
been asked to pass upon the question of whether the patentee might
restrict the use of the patented product after its sale (Cotton-Tie Co.
v. Simmons (1882) 106 U. S. 89, 27 L. Ed. 79, 1 S. Ct. 52; Cortelyou
v. Johnson (1907) 207 U. S. 196, 52 L. Ed. 167, 28 S. Ct. 105), but in
each case had found it unnecessary to determine the question. Cf.
Morgan Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co. (1894) 152 U. S. 425, 38 L.
Ed. 500, 14 S. Ct. 627, in which the Court animadverted upon the use
of a patent to obtain a monopoly upon an unpatented article.
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ment upon it followed almost immediately after the Dick case.
In the term following that in which the Dick decision was hand-
ed down, the Court had before it the legality under the Sher-
man Act of a group of license agreements under which sixteen
manufacturers of 85% of the enameled ware sold in this country
were licensed to use a patented tool in the manufacture of en-
ameled ware and agreed to sell at prices fixed by the licensor
and to require all jobbers to whom the manufacturers sold to
enter into license agreements by which the jobbers bound
themselves to resell the ware at prices determined by the man-
ufacturers." The lower court held that, since enameled ware
was unpatented, the owner of the patent upon the tool had no
right to fix the price at which the ware was sold.' The Su-
preme Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the right
to fix prices under Bement v. National Harrow" applied to the
unpatented product of a patented tool as well as to a patented
product. It held that the license agreements, taken together,
constituted an unlawful combination because the purpose and
effect of the agreements was to eliminate competition through-
out most of the industry, both horizontally and vertically. This
price-fixing scheme, the Court said, "transcended what was nec-
essary to protect the use of the patent or the monopoly which
the law conferred upon it" and "passed to the purpose and ac-
complished a restraint of trade condemned by the Sherman
law. ) M
The Standard Sanitary case involved the first direct attack
by the Government against the use of patents to restrain trade.
It resulted in a decision which restored much-needed vitality to
the Sherman Act.' Each license agreement between the patent
w'Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States (1912) 226 U. S. 20, 57
L. Ed. 107, 33 S. Ct. 9.
"United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. (C. C. Md. 1911) 191 F.
172.
OD upra.
wStandard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, supra, p. 48.
"After the decision in Bement v. National Harrow, supra, the court
of appeals for the seventh circuit concluded that "patented articles,
unless or until they are released by the owner of the patent from the
dominion of his monopoly, are not articles of trade or commerce among
the several states" and, consequently, that patent license agreements
eliminating price competition throughout an industry were not unlaw-
ful. Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co. (C. C.
A. 7th, 1907) 154 F. 358. For a similar holding by the same court, see
Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co. (C. C. A. 7th,
1907) 154 F. 365. This court has recently declared (American Equip-
ment Co. v. Tuthill (C. C. A. 7th, 1934) 69 F. (2d) 406) that the
Rubber Tire Wheel case "must be read in the light of and as modified
by later decisions of the Supreme Court." The decisions of the dis-
trict court In Indiana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case (C. C. E. D. Wis. 1906)
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holder and a manufacturer was, separately considered, lawful
under the holding of the Court in the Bement case. Likewise,
the jobber agreements had some color of legality since it was
generally believed at that time that a patent holder might con-
trol the resale price of a patented article.' The decision went
far to dissipate the current conception created by the Dick and
related cases that the patentee's rights must be treated as ab-
solute and were, therefore, virtually unaffected by the Sherman
Act. The decision plainly was a "strategic retreat'" from the
holding of the Dick case.
The second retreat of the Court occurred in 1913. By that
time, the illegality under the Sherman Act of resale price main-
tenance agreements had become established. Two years before,
the Court had held that contracts fixing resale prices for unpat-
ented articles violated the Sherman Act." This was followed by
a decision that, since the copyright law did not authorize resale
price maintenance,' an attempt to control the resale price of
copyrighted books violated the Sherman Act.' In Bauer & Cie
v. O'Donnell," the patentee's rights yielded to the philosophy
of the Sherman Act thus articulated. In that case, the Court
was presented for the first time with the question whether a
patentee might require a purchaser to abide by resale prices set
by the patentee. In Bobbs-Merrill v. Straus," the Court had
concluded that the "sole liberty" given to the author of print-
ing and vending his writing was not as broad as the sole right
148 F. 21, and Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co.
(C. C. E. D. Wis. 1906) 142 F. 531, probably represent the law today.OAfter the decision in the Button-Fastener case, various lower federal
courts held that a patentee might fix the resale price for his patented
product. See Victor Talking Machine Co. v. The Fair (C. C. A. 7th,
1903) 123 F. 424; Edison Phonograph Co. v. Kaufmann (C. C. Pa.
1901) 105 F. 960; National Phonograph Co. v. Schlegel (C. C. A. 8th,
1904) 128 F. 733; The Fair v. Dover Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 7th, 1908) 166
F. 117. Some of these decisions were relied on by the Court in the
Dick case in support of its holding that a patentee might control the
use of a patented article in the hands of a purchaser, and this hold-
ing logically led to the conclusion that, if a patentee could control the
use of a patented product by a purchaser, he might control the sale by
the purchaser. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co., supra, pp. 515-516.
'The quoted words are from MONOGRAPH No. 31, PATENTS AND FREE
ENTERPRISE, p. 65, written by Walton Hamilton for the TNEC.
"Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co. (1911) 220 U. S.
373, 55 L. Ed. 502, 31 S. Ct. 376.
"Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus (1908) 210 U. S. 339, 52 L. Ed. 1086, 28
S. Ct. 722.
eStraus v. American Publishers' Ass'n. (1913) 231 U. S. 222, 58 L. Ed.
192, 34 S. Ct. 84.
'229 U. S. 1, supra.
'Supra.
"Act of March 4, 1909, §1, 35 STAT. 1075, 17 U. S. C. §1.
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given to an inventor to make and vend his invention and that,
therefore, assuming (without deciding) that an inventor might
control the resale price of a patented article, the copyright law
afforded no such right to the author. In Bauer v. O'Donnell,
the Court found such a distinction between the copyright and
patent laws incongrous. The Court declared that Congress "had
no intention to use the term 'vend' in one sense in the patent
act and 'vending' in another in the copyright law" and con-
cluded that "the terms used in the statutes are to all intents the
same.'"m Consequently, the Court held that, since the right con-
ferred upon an author did not authorize resale price control, it
necessarily followed that the same right conferred upon an in-
ventor did not permit such price control.
The decision in the Bauer case presaged the eventual over-
ruling of the Dick case. The two holdings were logically irrec-
oncilable and the effort of the Court to distinguish the two in
Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell was unconvincing. It was Congress,
however, which provided the impetus for the repudiation by the
Court of Henry v. Dick.
In 1914, Congress, concerned with the monopolistic menace
of tying agreements which bound purchasers or lessees of ma-
chines to use unpatented materials with the machines,' passed
Section 3 of the Clayton Act," which makes it unlawful for any
person engaged in interstate commerce "to lease or make a sale
or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery,
supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented,
.... on the condition ... that the lessee or purchaser thereof
shall not use or deal in the goods, wares, merchandise, machin-
ery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor . . ." where
the effect thereof may be substantially to lessen competition or
to create a monopoly.
Shortly after the passage of the Act, a circuit court of ap-
peals concluded that a license arrangement substantially the
same as that involved in the Dick case violated this section of
the Clayton Act." When the case came before the Supreme
"Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, supra, p. 13.
"See that part of the REPORT OF THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE
HousE OF REPRESENTATIVES on §3 of the Clayton Act quoted in United
States v. United Shoe Machinery Co. (D. C. E. D. Mo. 1915) 227 F.
507.
"Act of October 15, 1914, c. 323, 38 STAT. 731, 15 U. S. C. §14.
"Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co. (C. C. A. 2d,
1916) 235 F. 398. The Motion Picture Patents Co. was the owner of a
patent covering a part of the mechanism in motion picture projectors
for feeding film through the machine. The machine was sold to ex-
hibitors with the restriction that the machine was to be used only
with films of Motion Picture Patents Co. Universal supplied film to
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Court, the Court noted that Section 3 of the Clayton Act was
passed "as if in response" to the decision in Henry v. Dick
and was "a most persuasive expression of the public policy
of our country . . . " The Court did not content itself, how-
ever, with a holding that Section 3 of the Clayton Act barred
agreements which the Court in the Dick case had held were per-
missible under the patent monopoly. Instead, it re-examined the
principle of the Dick case and in a sweeping opinion concluded
that the principle there enunciated was unsound.
Peril to the public interest from such agreements is the
leitmotiv of the opinion. The Court pointed out, relying upon
early cases," that the primary purpose of the patent laws "is not
the creation of private fortunes for the owners of patents.'
Instead, the right of the inventor is subordinate to the dominant
purpose of the patent laws "to promote the progress of science
and useful arts." "The obvious possibility for gain" in the use
of restrictions approved by the Button-Fastener case "led to an
immediate and widespread adoption of the system, in which these
restrictions expanded into more and more comprehensive forms
. ." =According to the Court, the plan of Motion Picture Pat-
ents Co. represented the extreme of practices which the doctrine
of the Button-Fastener case seemed to approve. "The patent
law furnishes no warrant for such a practice and the cost, in-
convenience and annoyance to the public which the opposite con-
clusion would occasion forbid it. '"
The Court held that the protection given by a patent is lim-
ited to the machine described in the patent; the patent laws have
no concern with the material with which or upon which the ma-
chine operates. The right, if any, to restrict the use by another
to particular materials is derived, not from the patent, but from
the general law, and, accordingly, the enforceability of such a
restriction must depend upon the same law applicable to other
kinds of contractual arrangements. The contract of Motion Pic-
an exhibitor for use in one of the machines and Motion Picture Pat-
ents sued for contributory infringement.
TMotion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., aupra, pp.
517-518.
"Pennock v. Dialogue (1829) 2 Pet. 1, 27 U. S. 1, 7 L. Ed. 327, and Ken-
dall v. Winsor (1858) 21 How. 322, 62 U. S. 322, 16 L. Ed. 165.
"Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra, pp. 510-
511.
'Id., pp. 515-516.
"Id., p. 516. In Henry v. Dick, supra, the Court, In response to the con-
tention that restrictions upon purchasers were contrary to public pol-
icy, stated (p. 35) that "arguments based upon suggestions of public
policy not recognized in the patent laws are not relevant. The field to
which we are invited by such arguments is legislative, not judicial."
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ture Patents was not enforceable because to enforce it would be
to create a monopoly in unpatented film.
The decisions in the Bauer and Motion Picture Patents cases
paved the way for a reconsideration of the holding in Bement v.
National Harrow, the basic premise of which-that the right to
impose any condition upon use which the patentee may choose
is an incident of the right to exclude-was termed by the Court
in the Motion Picture Patents case "a defect" in "thinking",
which "springs from the substituting of inference and argument
for the language of the [patent] statute and from failure to dis-
tinguish" between the rights conferred by the patent laws and
the rights which a patentee might create by private contract."
II.
In 1912, the General Electric Company entered into a li-
cense agreement with its largest competitor, Westinghouse Elec-
tric & Manufacturing Company, in which it licensed Westing-
house to use certain patents covering the manufacture of electric
light bulbs with the tungsten filament and reserved the right to
fix Westinghouse's price for light bulbs. In United States v.
General Electric Company," involving the legality under the
Sherman Act of the price provision of this license,' the Court
was called upon to reconsider its holding in the Bement case.
In a brief opinion, the Court rejected the principal argu-
ment of the Government" that Bement v. National Harrow had
in effect been overruled by the Motion Picture Patents case,"
and concluded that the price provision of the Westinghouse li-
cense was lawful. The gist of the holding is contained in the
following excerpt from the opinion:
"... The patentee may make and grant a license to an-
other to make and use the patented articles, but withhold
"Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., supra, p. 514.
"272 U. S. 476.'In the same suit, the Government attacked General Electric's del
credere agency system by which it controlled the price at which its
distributors sold electric light bulbs. The Supreme Court held that the
distributors were bona tide agents and that, therefore, the system was
lawful, thus laying the legal groundwork for one of the currently pop-
ular methods of vertical price control. The Government is seeking a
reconsideration of this holding in United States v. Masonite Corp., now
on appeal to the Supreme Court. The complaint of the Government
was dismissed by the district court. (S. D. N. Y. 1941) 40 F. Supp. 852.
OBRIE FOI THE UNITED STATES, pp. 64-74.
"The doctrine repudiated by the Motion Picture Patents case was, ac-
cording to the Court, much broader than was necessary for the holding
in the Bement case, since (p. 493) "the price at which a patented ar-
ticle sells is certainly a circumstance having a more direct relation,
and Is more germane to the rights of the patentee, than the unpatented
material with which the patented article may be used."
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his right to sell them. The licensee in such a case acquires
an interest in the articles made. He owns the material of
them and may use them. But if he sells them, he infringes
the right of the patentee, and may be held for damages and
enjoined. If the patentee goes further, and licenses the
selling of the articles, may he limit the selling by limiting
the method of sale and the price ? We think he may do so,
provided the conditions of sale are normally and reasonably
adapted to secure pecuniary reward for the patentee's mo-
nopoly. One of the valuable elements of the exclusive right
of a patentee is to acquire profit by the price at which the
article is sold. The higher the price, the greater the profit,
unless it is prohibitory. When the patentee licenses another
to make and vend, and retains the right to continue to make
and vend on his own account, the price at which his licensee
will sell will necessarily affect the price at which he can sell
his own patented goods. It would seem entirely reasonable
that he should say to the licensee, 'Yes, you may make and
sell articles under my patent, but not so as to destroy the
profit that I wish to obtain by making them and selling
them myself.' He does not thereby sell outright to the li-
censee the articles the latter may make and sell, or vest ab-
solute ownership in them. He restricts the property and
interest the licensee has in the goods he makes and proposes
to sell." '
Aside from the fact that the Court paid lip service to the
demise of the Button-Fastener holding but gave posthumous rec-
ognition to the ratio decidendi of the case,' the soundness of the
Court's reasoning is, it is believed, extremely doubtful.
It is true, as the Court said, that when a patentee retains
the right to make and sell a patented product which he has li-
censed another to make and sell, licensee price control directly
protects the right thus retained by the patentee. If the paten-
tee's right to sell were a right granted by the patent laws, then
it might follow that the patentee should be permitted to invoke
those laws to enforce conditions designed to protect the exercise
of that right. But a patentee's right to make, use, and vend is
not a right derived from the patent laws." It is "a right under
"United States v. General Electric Co., 8upra, p. 490
'As in the Button-Fastener case, the emphasis in the General Electric
case Is upon the "pecuniary reward of the patentee." Moreover, In the
Button-Fastener case, the condition imposed upon the use of the ma-
chine by a purchaser was deemed lawful because the patentee had
the right absolutely to prohibit the use of the machine by another. In
the General Electric case, the Court found that the condition upon the
sale of the patented bulb was lawful because the patentee had the
right absolutely to prohibit the sale of the bulb by another.
wBauer & Cie v. O'Donnell, supra, p. 10.
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the common law not arising under the federal patent laws and
not within the grant of power to Congress to enact such laws
•..2' Consequently, the Court, in effect, has held that a patent
may be used to protect, not only the right conferred by the pat-
ent to exclude others, but the common-law right of the patentee
to make and sell which the Court has repeatedly stated was un-
affected by the patent laws.
Moreover, if a price provision of a license protects a right
granted by the patent, a violation of the provision should give
rise to an action for infringement. It seems clear, however, that
a sale by a licensee below minimum prices fixed by a patentee
would not constitute infringement of the patent.
Where a patentee conveys the right to make, use, and vend,
and reserves only the right to fix the licensee's selling price, he
has not restricted the right of the licensee to share in the pat-
entee's monopoly by reserving for himself any part of the mo-
nopoly conferred by the patent. The licensee is free to sell with-
out any restriction, provided he sells at prices specified by the
patentee. The price provision of the license is merely a condi-
tion upon the exercise of the unrestricted right to make, use,
and vend.
A comparison of the cases in which the Court has permitted
the patentee to sue his licensee for infringement with those
where the Court has declined to permit such an action demon-
strates that a breach of a condition imposed upon the exercise of
an unrestricted right to make and vend is not a ground for in-
fringement proceedings. In each of the cases in which the Court
has held that a suit for infringement lies against the licensee, the
patentee had refrained from granting to the licensee the unre-
stricted right to make, use, or vend, and had carved out an area
in which the patentee alone might exercise the rights conferred
by the patent.' In each case the licensee had gone beyond the
rights conferred by the license and had invaded the part of the
monopoly reserved by the patentee. On the other hand, the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly held that, where there has been a
breach by the licensee of a condition of a license (e.g., payment
'Crown Die & Tool Co. v. Nye Tool & Machine Works, supra, p. 35.
'In Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 8upra, the patentee reserved the right to
sell to the United States Government. In Mitchell v. Hawley, 8upra,
the patentee reserved the right to make, use, and vend during the pe-
riod of the extension of the patent grant. In General Talking Pic-
tures Co. v. Western Electric Co., supra, the patentee reserved the
right to supply the patented article for commercial use. In Littlefield
v. Periry (1874) 21 Wall. 205, 88 U. S. 205, the equitable owner of the
patent reserved the exclusive right to apply the principle of the pat-
ent, except for "one special purpose."
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of royalties), the patentee must sue upon the contract and can-
not bring an action for infringement.' In those cases the paten-
tee reserved no part of his monopoly so far as his licensee was
concerned. Instead, he granted the unrestricted right to make,
use, and vend, provided the licensee met the condition of the li-
cense involved in the particular case.
Finally, where, as in the General Electric case, it is contem-
plated by the patentee that his licensee will exercise the unre-
stricted right to make, use, and vend, it is fair to assume that
the royalty provided in the license is intended to constitute full
consideration for the sale of this right. Under the holding of
the cases referred to before,' the license, therefore, constitutes
an outright sale for full consideration of the unrestricted right
to make, use, and vend, and, when the licensee makes the pat-
ented article, it should be deemed to be no longer within the
monopoly of the patentee.'
From what has been said, it would seem that if any limi-
tation upon the price competition of a licensee is legally defen-
sible it must rest upon the contractual and not the patent rights
of the patentee. The question then arises, Is price control a law-
ful exercise of the contractual rights of the patentee?
The Sherman Act prohibits only those contracts which are
in unreasonable restraint of trade." In determining whether a
contract is unreasonable, the courts are guided by the common-
law doctrine of restraint of trade. At common law an agree-
ment by the buyer of property not to use it in competition with
the business retained by the seller was considered reasonable be-
cause ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract of sale,"
"Wilson v. Sanford (1850) 10 How. 99, 51 U. S. 99; Hartell v. Tilgh-
man (1878) 9 Otto 547, 99 U. S. 547; Albright v. Teas (1882) 106 U. S.
613, 27 L. Ed. 295, 1 S. Ct. 550; Dale Tile Mfg. Co. v. Hyatt (1888)
125 U. S. 46, 31 L. Ed. 683, 8 S. Ct. 756; Pratt v. Paris Light & Coke
Co. (1897) 168 U. S. 255, 42 L. Ed. 458, 18 S. Ct. 62. See also Felix v.
Scharnweber (1888) 125 U. S. 54, 58, 31 L. Ed. 687, 8 S. Ct. 759;
Goodyear v. Union India Rubber Co. (C. C. N. Y. 1857) 4 Blatchf. 63;
Blanchard v. Sprague (C. C. Mass. 1859) 1 Cliff. 288; Mersersole v.
Union Paper Collar Co. (C. C. N. Y. 1869) 6 Blatchf. 356. Cf. Marsh
v. Nichols (1891) 140 U. S. 344, 35 L. Ed. 413, 11 S. Ct. 798; Wade v.
Lawder (1897) 165 U. S. 624, 41 L. Ed. 851, 17 S. Ct. 425.
"Supra, p. 5.
"Bloomer v. McQuewan, supra; Bloomer v. Milinger, supra; Adams v.
Burke, supra; Bauer v. O'Donnell, aupra.
"Standard Oil Co. v. United States (1911) 221 U. S. 1, 55 L. Ed. 619,
31 S. Ct. 502.
"Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader (1940) 310 U. S. 469, 498, 84 L. Ed. 1311,
60 S. Ct. 982.
"For a discussion of the common-law doctrine applicable to ancillary
agreements not to compete, see United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co. (C. C. A. 6th, 1898) 85 F. 271, 279-291; Oregon Steam Navigation
18
Montana Law Review, Vol. 3 [1942], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol3/iss1/13
PRICE-FIXING UNDER PATENT LICENSE
and, in accordance with this rule, the Supreme Court has held
that an agreement by the transferee of a secret process for the
production of a proprietary medicine not to sell the medicine be-
low prices specified by the transfer does not involve an un-
reasonable restraint of trade." There is, therefore, ground for
argument that an agreement by a licensee not to compete with
his licensor, which is ancillary to the sale of the right to make
and vend a patented product, does not fall within the prohibi-
tions of the Sherman Act.
Covenants not to compete were lawful at common law, how-
ever, not because they benefited the contracting parties, but be-
cause they tended to promote transactions which might not be
carried out without the security against competition which the
covenant afforded." If, therefore, a covenant not to compete in
a patent license agreement is a reasonable restraint of trade,
there must be ground to believe that such a covenant is neces-
sary to induce a patentee to license others to use his patent. If
the effect of-outlawing such covenants would be to prevent pat-
ent licenses because of the patentee's fear of the competition of
his licensee, there might be good reason to permit price control.
On the other hand, if the advantages to the patentee of licens-
ing others are likely to overcome any apprehension which he
might have of his licensee's competition, then the justification
recognized at common law for such an ancillary agreement not
to compete does not exist and the interest of the public in free
competition would seem to dictate that such covenants be con-
demned.
In the General Electric case, the district court stated that
the risk of having the patentee's business destroyed by his li-
censee would compel the patentee "as a matter of ordinary busi-
ness prudence ... to keep his patent monopoly wholly within his
own hands" unless he could control his licensee's competition.
Whether this is true where there is merely a patented improve-
ment upon a product of an established industry is at least open
to some debate.
There may be decided disadvantages to single exploitation
by the patentee of the market for the improved product. This
may require substantial expansion in production and marketing
Co. v. Winsor (1873) 20 Wall. 64, 87 U. S. 64; Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., supra., pp. 406-408; John D. Park & Sons
Co. v. Hartman (C. C. A. 6th, 1907) 153 F. 24, 40-46.
'Fowle v. Park (1889) 131 U. S. 88, 33 L. Ed. 67, 9 S. Ct. 658.
NUnited States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., supra, pp. 281-282.
OUnited States v. General Electric Co. (N. D. Ohio E. D. 1925) 15 F.
(2d) 715, 718.
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facilities involving heavy expense. Competitors, if unable to
duplicate the improvement, will inevitably undersell in order to
retain their position in the market and the result may well be a
more unstable price structure than before the improved product
went upon the market. The improvement may also stimulate
others in the industry to develop non-infringing improvements
which may neutralize the advantage gained by the patentee. Or
the rest of the industry, desperate to preserve its competitive po-
sition, may attempt to use the patented improvement and, thus,
require the patentee to engage in expensive patent litigation
which may result in judicial action substantially impairing the
value of the patent.
The possibility of avoiding all of this and at the same time
obtaining substantial financial returns through royalties from
those licensed might well lead the patentee to conclude that the
advantages from licensing his competitors overcome the risk of
their competition.'
Even assuming that a categorical ban upon price control in
patent licenses might not be in the interest of the public, the
lawfulness of contractual provisions for such control should at
least be determined upon the facts and circumstances of each
case, since such is the traditional approach of the courts in ap-
praising ancillary covenants not to compete." If there has been
no substantial lessening of competition and price control appears
essential to stimulate licensing, a covenant not to compete might
be considered lawful. If, on the other hand, a substantial lessen-
ing of competition has occurred in an industry theretofore com-
petitive and the effect of the licensing arrangement is to permit
the patentee to dominate an entire industry, price control might
well be deemed unlawful because of its adverse effect upon com-
petition, which it is the policy of the Sherman Act to preserve."
uThe Ford Motor Company has followed the practice for years of li-
censing others to use its patents royalty free. HAaINos BEFORB TNEC,
Part II, pp. 256-257. Packard Motor Company customarily grants pat-
ent licenses without any price or other restrictions. Id., pp. 304-305.
Most of the members of the automobile industry are members of the
Automobile Manufacturers' Association which has promoted and su-
pervises a cross-licensing arrangement between members of the Asso-
ciation whereby each member pools in the Association all patents
owned by it and is entitled without restriction to use any of the pat-
ents pooled by the other members. This arrangement was the prod-
uct of a desire to avoid litigation and the confusion and uncertainty
which results from disputes as to the scope and validity of patents.
As a result of the arrangement, there has not been a single patent suit
among the members of the Association in 22 years. Id., pp. 285-303.
"Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1889) 130 U. S. 396, 409, 32 L. Ed. 979,
9 S. Ct. 553; Fowle v. Park, supra, p. 97. See supra, p. 22, footnote 94.
'*Compare Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, supra, with Soco-
ny Vacuum Oil Co. v. United States, supra.
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Other considerations, such as the nature of the patent, the scope
of the license, both temporally and spatially, and the purpose of
the parties in executing the license, might well bear inquiry, if
the legality of price control is to be appraised along traditional
lines.
What has been said so far upon the subject of covenants not
to compete as to price is based upon the assumption that their
lawfulness under the Sherman Act is influenced by the common
law. This, however, is a matter of some doubt. In 1927, the
Supreme Court for the first time held that price-fixing by those
controlling a trade or business in any substantial manner was
unlawful despite the reasonableness of the prices agreed upon.'
This holding has since been followed by the declaration of the
Court in Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States" that "agree-
ments for price maintenance of articles moving in interstate
commerce are, without more, unreasonable restraints within the
meaning of the Sherman Act . . ." and by the sweeping state-
ment of the Court in United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.'
that "whatever may have been the status of price-fixing agree-
ments at common law..., the Sherman Act has a broader ap-
plication to them than the common law prohibitions or sanctions.
See United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association, 166 U.
S. 290, 328... Whatever economic justification particular price-
fixing agreements may be thought to have, the law does not per-
mit an inquiry into their reasonableness. They are all banned
because of their actual or potential threat to the central nervous
system of the economy."
It is hardly reasonable to suppose that the Supreme Court
in the Socony-Vacuum case inadvertently relied upon the Trans-
Missouri case, the holding of which-that all restraints were un-
lawful under the Sherman Act notwithstanding their reasonable-
ness at common law-was rejected by the Supreme Court in the
later case of Standard Oil Co. v. United States.' It seems more
likely that the sweeping language of the Court and its reliance
upon this case indicate a disposition on the part of the Court to
give a literal interpretation to the language of the Sherman Act
where price-fixing agreements are involved and, thus, to aban-
don the common law "rule of reason" as a determinant of the
legality of such agreements.
1 1United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., supra, p. 398.
IO2(1940) 309 U. S. 436, 458, 84 L. Ed. 852, 60 S. Ct. 618.
'Supra, pp. 225-226.10 'Supra,
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III.
It is a matter for some encouragement to those concerned
with the conflict between the patent laws and the Sherman Act
which has resulted from the decision in the General Electric
case that decisions since that case which bear upon its holding'
at least indicate no intention on the part of the Court to expand
upon the holding. There is, moreover, enough in the later eases
to support the belief that the trend of the Court has once again
changed,' and that an attempt to induce the Court to limit, or
even to overrule, the General Electric decision might prove fruit-
ful.
107
After its decision in Bauer & Cie v. O'Donnel "' and before
the General Electric case, the Supreme Court had twice refused
to sanction the use of ingenious patent licensing plans to obtain
resale price maintenance,' and had once held that the control
.. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States (1931) 283 U. S. 163, 75
L. Ed. 926, 51 S. Ct. 421; Ethyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States,
8upra; Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Corp. (1931) 283 U. S. 27,
75 L. Ed. 819, 51 S. Ct. 334; Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co. (1938) 302
U. S. 458, 82 L. Ed. 371, 58 S. Ct. 288; Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co.
(decided Jan. 5, 1942) . ..... U  S ........ supra; B. B. Chemical Co. v.
Ellis (decided Jan. 5, 1942) . ..... U  S ........ The last four cases are
sometimes referred to as the "improper use" eases--a short-hand de-
scription of their doctrine that the use of a patent to gain a monop-
oly in an unpatented article constitutes an improper use of the patent.
1'The only case decided since the General Electric case which might
appear to indicate the contrary is General Talking Pictures Co. v.
Western Electric Co., 8upra, in which the Court held that the vendee
of a patented radio tube purchased from a licensee who was licensed
to sell only for use for noncommercial purposes was liable for con-
tributory infringement when the vendee made commercial use of the
patented tube. While the Court relied upon the General Electric case
(304 U. S. 175, 181-182; 305 U. S. 124, 127), the case Is really based
upon Mitchell v. Hawley, supra, in which the Court held that a tem-
poral restriction upon use followed the patented article to the hands
of a purchaser. The decisions in both Mitchell v. Hawley and the
General Talking Pictures case, in so far as they permit control after
sale of the patented article, are difficult to reconcile with the early
decisions of Adams v. Burke, supra, and Hobbie v. Jennison, supra
(see the dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Black in the General Talk-
ing Pictures case, 304 U. S. 183, 305 U. S. 128), but, for reasons pre-
viously explained, supra, pp. 21, 22, the doctrine of those cases could
still be sound, although that of the General Electric case was over-
ruled.
"'The Government stated in its brief in the Ethyl case that it will ask
the Court in an appropriate case to reconsider its holding in the
General Electric case (Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, supra,
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES, p. 72). In United States v. Univis
Lens Co. (S. D. N. Y. 1941) 41 F. Supp. 258, now on appeal to the Su-
preme Court, the Government is urging that the General Electric case
be overruled.
"'Supra.
"Straus v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (1917) 243 U. S. 490, 61 L. Ed.
866, 37 S. Ct. 412; Boston Store v. American Graphophone Co. (1918)
246 U. S. 8, 62 L. Ed. 551, 38 S. Ct. 257.
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of purchasers' prices under such a plan violated the Sherman
Act."° The General Electric decision was an incentive for an-
other attempt to use the rights of the patentee to control resale
prices. In Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States,"u' the Court
adhered to the earlier authorities and again refused to counten-
ance price control after the sale of the patented article.
Ethyl was engaged in the manufacture and sale of a pat-
ented fluid compound to be added to gasoline to eliminate
"knocking" in automobile motors. The corporation held pat-
ents upon the gasoline in which the fluid was mixed, as well as
upon the fluid. It licensed most of the major refiners to mix
the fluid with the gasoline and to sell the patented gasoline, but
only to jobbers also licensed by Ethyl.
Both the refiner and jobber licenses were silent as to jobber
resale prices, but the licensing plan was implemented by an in-
vestigative system under which Ethyl investigated the "business
ethics" (price-cutting proclivities) of applicants for jobber li-
censes and of jobber licensees. Unfavorable reports on the "bus-
iness ethics" of a jobber were frequently cause for refusal by
Ethyl to license a jobber, and, if a licensed jobber indulged in
price-cutting, it was a simple matter, because of the prevailing
view in the industry that such practices would lead to cancella-
tion of jobber licenses, for Ethyl to correct this by calling it to
the attention of the jobber or his supplying company.
Despite the fact that the restraint upon the sale of gasoline
by jobbers was achieved, in part, through a restriction imposed
by the licensor upon the refiner licensees limiting those to whom
the refiners might sell-a limitation which found some support
in the General Electric case-the Supreme Court had no diffi-
culty in holding along settled lines that the plan violated the
Sherman Act. In the view of the Court, the licenses and the ma-
chinery supplementing them involved an attempt to control the
resale price of gasoline in the hands of jobbers after there had
been an intervening sale. The sale of gasoline to the jobbers
terminated the patent monopoly, and resale price maintenance
was, therefore, unlawful under the Sherman Act.'
"'United States v. Schrader's Son, Inc. (1920) 252 U. S. 85, 64 L. Ed.
471, 40 S. Ct. 251.
"lupra.
"2The Government contended that the program of Ethyl involved coer-
cion to destroy the freedom of action of jobbers in reselling gasoline
within the doctrine of Federal Trade Commission v. Beech-Nut Pack-
ing Co. (1922) 257 U. S. 441, 66 L. Ed. 307, 42 S. Ct. 150 (BRIEF FOR
THE UNITED STATES, pp. 84-91). Ethyl contended (BRIEF FOR THE
ETHYL CORPORATION, pp. 61-71) that it was simply exercising its right
to refuse to permit the sale of patented gasoline to price-cutters within
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The holding of the Ethyl case refusing to permit the use of
the General Electric case as a vehicle for resale price control is
further fortified by the criticism expressed by the Court of the
argument of the Ethyl Corporation that the restrictions which
it imposed upon the sale of the patented gasoline by its refiner
licensees tended to enhance the pecuniary reward which it re-
ceived from the sale of the patented fluid. The Court pointed
out that "the licensing conditions are thus not used as a means
of stimulating the commercial development and financial re-
turns of the patented invention which is licensed, but for . . .
the exploitation of a second patent monopoly not embraced in
the first." This, the Court stated, was not permissible, for "the
patent monopoly of one invention may no more be enlarged for
the exploitation of a monopoly of another ... than for the ex-
ploitation of an unpatented article ... or for the exploitation or
promotion of a business not embraced within the patent.'"'
The decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States' is im-
portant, not so much for its holding as for the caveats which it
implies. In that case the Supreme Court held that an arrange-
ment whereby owners of patents covering processes for the crack-
ing of gasoline cross-licensed each other under agreements which
the holding of United States v. Colgate & Co. (1919) 250 U. S. 300,
63 L. Ed. 992, 39 S. Ct. 465. See also Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing
Co. (1921) 256 U. S. 208, 65 L. Ed. 892, 41 S. Ct. 451. The Supreme
Court declared (at p. 457) in response to these contentions that "the
picture here revealed is not that of a patentee exercising its right to
refuse to sell or to permit his licensee to sell the patented products to
price-cutters." Three district courts have since construed this as a
negative pregnant with the affirmative that under the Colgate case it
is lawful for a patent licensor and his licensees concertedly to refuse
to sell to price-cutters. United States v. Univis Lens Co., supra;
United States v. United States Gypsum Co. (D. C. D. C., unreported
opinion upon order directing verdicts for defendants) ; United States
v. Wayne Pump Co. (N. D. Ill., unreported opinion upon order sus-
taining demurrers to Indictments). This, it is believed, represents an
unwarranted extension of the "single trader" doctrine of United States
v. Colgate & Co., supra.
mEthyl Gasoline Corporation v. United States, supra, p. 459. After the
decision, Ethyl abandoned a restriction in the refiner licenses requir-
ing premium gasoline to be sold at a differential above regular grade
gasoline containing the patented fluid, because of the criticism by the
Court quoted in the text. In United States v. Univis Lens Co., supra,
Univis holds patents upon bifocal lenses. It sells the unpatented blanks
(which can only be used for the lenses) to manufacturing wholesalers
who are licensed by Univis to convert the blanks into lenses and are
required to sell the lenses at prices set by Univis. It is possible that
the Court may hold that Univis, in attempting to protect the price at
which it sells unpatented blanks by Its patent upon the product of the
blanks, is using the patent "for the exploitation of an unpatented ar-
ticle . . . or for the exploitation or promotion of a business not em-
braced within the patent."n4supra.
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contained no restrictions upon the sale of gasoline and which
did not effect a monopoly of any kind or produce any restraint
upon interstate commerce, was lawful under the Sherman Act.
In the lower courts, the use of cross-license agreements (com-
monly known as patent pools) to fix prices even upon patented
products has usually been condemned,"' although one court has
held that this was lawful." The citation in the Standard Oil
case of some of the lower court cases condemning price-fixing
under patent pools and the statement of the Court that "the
lawful individual monopolies granted by the patent statutes
cannot be unitedly exercised to restrain competition""' show
that the Court would not permit the General Electric case to
stand in the way of a holding that a patent pool, at least of com-
petitive patents, may not be used to eliminate price competition.
Whether or not the owner of a patent upon a process or
machine may fix the price at which the unpatented product of
the machine or process is sold has never been directly passed
upon by the Supreme Court. Two early cases decided by that
Court offer some support for the view that a patentee has no
right to control the unpatented product." Two lower courts
have taken the view that a patent upon a machine confers no
'National Harrow Co. v. Hench, supra; National Harrow Co. v. Quick,
supra (arrangement by which harrow manufacturers dominating the
industry assigned their patents to a patent holding company and
took out licenses under which each company bound Itself to sell at
agreed-upon prices) ; Blount Mfg. Co. v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co. (C. C.
Mass. 1909) 166 F. 555 (cross-licenses between two manufacturers of
doorchecks owning competing patents, under which each bound himself
to sell at the same price as the other) ; United States v. New Depar-
ture Mfg. Co. (W. D. N. Y. 1913) 204 F. 107 (use of patent licenses to
give color of legality to a scheme In which manufacturers of 85% of
the coaster brakes sold in the United States agreed to sell at uniform
prices) ; United States v. Motion Picture Patents Co. (E. D. Pa. 1915)
225 F. 800 (pooling of patents upon film, cameras, projectors, and
parts of other equipment as part of a plan to dominate the motion
picture industry); Remington Rand, Inc. v. International Business
Machines Corp. (1937) 167 Misc. 108, 3 N. Y. S. (2d) 515 (cross-license
agreements between two companies owning patents covering sorting
and tabulating machines by which each company licensed the other
to use its patents and each agreed to lease machines only upon terms
specified in the agreement); Lynch v. Magnavox Co. (C. C. A. 9th,
1938) 94 F. (2d) 883 (attempt to monopolize by the pooling of pat-
ents covering radio loudspeakers).
'Rubber Tire Wheel Co. v. Milwaukee Rubber Works Co., supra; In-
diana Mfg. Co. v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., supra; Goshen
Rubber Works v. Single Tube Automobile & Bicycle Tire Co. (1908)
166 F. 431, all decided by the court of appeals for the seventh circuit.
See, supra, p. 15, footnote 61.
"'Supra, p. 174.
mKeplinger v. DeYoung (1825) 10 Wheat, 358, 23 U. S. 357; Simpson
v. Wilson (1846) 4. How. 709, 45 U. S. 709.
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such power;"9 one court has held to the contrary.' The dec-
laration of the Court in the Standard Oil case that "competing
processes for manufacturing an unpatented product" "are like-
ly to engender the evils at which the Sherman Act was directed"
and that, therefore, the effect and operation of the agreements
must be ascertained to determine whether they have resulted in
a monopoly or restriction of competition in the unpatented prod-
uct,' carries the implication that an attempt by a patentee to
control an unpatented product of his patented machine or pro-
cess would be condemned by the Court.
Furthermore, the question whether price control of an un-
patented product is an incident of the right conferred by a pat-
ent upon a process or machine by which the product is made may
well be disposed of by the "improper use" cases.' In the first
two of those cases, Carbice Corporation v. American Patents
Corp."' and Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co.,TM the Court held that
a patentee might not exact, as a condition of a license to use a
patented article or process, that unpatented materials used in con-
nection with the article or process be purchased only from the
licensor, even though the products were dynamic elements of
the inventions. According to those cases, "every use of a patent
as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented ma-
terial is prohibited," "whether the patent be for a machine, a
product, or a process."' This is broad language and the fact
that the Court has recently reaffirmed the principle and ex-
panded upon its application'm seems to indicate that the Court
u'United States v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 191 F. 172, supra;
American Equipment Co. v. Tuthill Bldg. Material Co., supra.
'"Straight Side Basket Corp. v. Webster Basket Co. (C. C. A. 2d, 1936)
82 F. (2d) 245. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana)
(N. D. Iil. 1929) 33 F. (2d) 617, 630.
tmUnited States v. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), smpra, pp. 175-179.
tmSupra, p. 26, footnote 105.
tMsupra.
"Hupra.
mLeitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., supra, p. 463.
tmThe Carbice and Barber Asphalt cases involved suits for contributory
infringment brought against companies supplying the unpatented ma-
terial for use with the patented article and process. In two cases
decided since the first of this year, the Court has held that the doc-
trine applies also in suits for direct infringment, and that the pat-
entee loses all right to sue under his patent until "it is able to show
that it has fully abandoned its present method of restraining compe-
tition in the sale of unpatented articles and that the consequences of
that practice have been fully dissipated." B. B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis,
...... U. S ....... , and Morton Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co ........ U. S ....... , de-
cided Jan. 5, 1942. For lower court cases applying the principle of
these cases see American Lecithin Co. v. Warfield (N. D. Ill. 1938) 23
F. Supp. 326, (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) 105 F. (2d) 207; Ferguson v. Amer-
ican Lecithin (D. C. R. I. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 294, (C. C. A. 1st, 1938)
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when presented with the question will hold that a patent upon
a machine or process no more sanctions an attempt to monopolize
the unpatented product thereof than it does an attempt to mo-
nopolize the unpatented material used with the patented process
or machine.W
The line of cases just discussed also has significance upon
the question of the right to use a patent upon an improvement of
an unpatented article of commerce to control the price of the
article. In the General Electric case, no issue was made of the
fact that the patents involved were only upon an improved fila-
ment and that General Electric by its license was enabled to
control the price of substantially all electric light bulbs, the
basic patents upon which had expired long before the license.
The doctrine of the "improper use" cases represents a reaffirm-
ation of the principle stated in the Motion Picture Patents case
that the scope of a patentee's rights "must be limited to the in-
vention described in the claims of its patent. "' In those cases
the Court appraises the patentee's rights, not on the basis of
legalistic doctrines of infringement, but on the realistic basis of
what he has contributed to the art. If the thing which the pat-
entee is seeking to protect by the patent is not, realistically con-
sidered, the invention which the patentee has made, then the
Court declines to act, even though, under different circumstan-
ces, the conduct against which the patentee complains might
give rise to an action for infringement.'
Where a patentee uses his patent upon an improvement to
fix the price upon an unpatented article, he is plainly expanding
upon the monopoly granted by his patent. His only contribu-
tion to the art is in the improvement; when he fixes the price
upon the entire article, he fixes a price not only for that which
94 F. (2d) 729; Philadelphia Co. v. Lechler Laboratory, Inc. (C. C. A.
2d 1939) 107 F. (2d) 747; Barber Asphalt Corp. v. LaFera Grecco Con-
tracting Co. (C. C. A. 3d, 1940) 116 F. (2d) 211 , Dehydrators, Ltd. V.
Petroite Corp., Ltd., (C. C. A. 9th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 183; Slater &
Co. v. Stebbins-Anderson Co. (D. Md. 1940) 31 F. Supp. 96, affirmed
(C. C. A. 4th, 1941) 117 F. (2d) 848.
"While the Court was not required in the "improper use" cases to de-
cide whether the arrangements, which it held were not protected by
the patent laws, violated the antitrust laws, it has held that where
there is a substantial lessening of competition from an arrangement
similar to those involved in the Carbice and related cases, the arrange-
ment violates Section 3 of the Clayton Act. International Business
Machines Co. v. United States (1936) 298 U. S. 131, 80 L. Ed. 1085,
56 S. Ct. 701.
2'Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Co., supra, p. 511.
'See Leeds & Catlin v. Victor Talking Machine Co. (1909) 213 U. S.
325, 53 L. Ed. 816, 29 S. Ct. 503. See also Cotton-Tie Co. v. Simmons,
supra. Cf. Wilson v. Simpson (1850) 9 How. 107, 50 U. S. 108; Morgan
Envelope Co. v. Albany Paper Co., supra.
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he has invented, but for that which is unpatented and in the
public domain.'
Regardless of the final outcome of the cases which the De-
partment of Justice has instituted within the last two years,
they should provide much-needed clarification of the law, which
will be of inestimable value to the business world and to those
charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws. The cases
since the General Electric case give some indication that the
Court will at least be reluctant to extend the rule there an-
nounced. It is quite possible that the Court may conclude that
the holding of the General Electric case has resulted in conflict
with the philosophy of the antitrust laws too profound to permit
the decision to stand if the antitrust laws are to have any vitality
whatever in an important field of commerce. If the Court con-
cludes that "competition, not combination, should be the law of
trade "" in patented as well as unpatened articles, then the
Sherman Act may be felt where it has as yet had little influence
as a standard of industrial conduct.
"In Interstate Circuit v. United States (1939) 306 U. S. 208, 83 L. Ed.
610, 59 S. Ct. 467, the defendants urged, by analogy to the rights of a
patentee, that a copyright upon motion picture films gave to the holder
of the copyright the right to fix the admission price of theaters ex-
hibiting the copyrighted films. The Court found it unnecessary to de-
cide this question, but stated (p. 228) :
Because a patentee has power to control the price at which his
licensee may sell the patented article, it does not follow that the
owner of a copyright can dictate . . . the admission price which
shall be paid for an entertainment which includes features other
than the particular picture licensed. (Italics supplied.)
"'Fashion Originators' Guild v. Federal Trade Commission, supra.
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